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Abstract
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the litera-
ture (Gus6eld and Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic
modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990; Knuth, Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems,
CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, vol. 10, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI,
1997), partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem, partly because of the elegance of the
associated structures and algorithms, and partly because of important practical applications, such
as the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, J. Political Economy 92(6) (1984) 991) and
similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the 6rst comprehensive study of variants
of the problem in which the preference lists of the participants are not necessarily complete and
not necessarily totally ordered. We show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a num-
ber of these variants are hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast
to the case where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem
instance may admit stable matchings of di@erent sizes. In this setting, examples of problems that
are hard are: 6nding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, determining whether a
given pair is stable—even if the indi@erence takes the form of ties on one side only, the ties
are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2; and 6nding,
or approximating, both an ‘egalitarian’ and a ‘minimum regret’ stable matching. However, we
give a 2-approximation algorithm for the problems of 6nding a stable matching of maximum or
minimum size. We also discuss the signi6cant implications of our results for practical matching
schemes. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
An instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) involves n men and
n women, each of whom ranks all the members of the opposite sex in strict order of
preference. A matching M in I is a one–one correspondence between the men and
women. We say that a (man,woman) pair (m;w) blocks M , or is a blocking pair with
respect to M , if m prefers w to pM (m), and w prefers m to pM (w), where pM (q)
denotes the partner of q in M . A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be
stable. It is known that every instance of SM admits at least one stable matching, and
that such a matching can be found in O(n2) time using the Gale=Shapley algorithm
[3].
1.1. Incomplete preference lists
A generalisation of SM occurs when the preference lists of those involved can be
incomplete. In this case, we say that person p is acceptable to person q if p appears
on the preference list of q, and unacceptable otherwise. We use SMI to stand for this
variant of SM where preference lists may be incomplete. A matching M in an instance
I of SMI is a one–one correspondence between a subset of the men and a subset of
the women, such that (m;w)∈M implies that each of m;w is acceptable to the other.
The revised notion of stability may be de6ned as follows: M is stable if there is no
(man,woman) pair (m;w), each of whom is either unmatched in M and 6nds the other
acceptable, or prefers the other to his=her partner in M . 3 (It follows from this de6nition
that, from the point of view of 6nding stable matchings, we may assume, without loss
of generality, that p is acceptable to q if and only if q is acceptable to p.) A stable
matching in I need not be a complete matching. However, all stable matchings in I
have the same size, and involve exactly the same men and exactly the same women
[4]. It is a simple matter to extend the Gale=Shapley algorithm to cope with preference
lists that may be incomplete (see [6, Section 1:4:2]).
We shall refer to the classical many–one generalisation of the (one–one) problem
SMI, which is relevant in a number of important applications, as the Hospitals=Residents
problem (HR) [6, 22]. An instance I of HR involves a set of residents and a set of
hospitals, each resident seeking a post at one hospital, and the ith hospital having ci
posts. Each resident strictly ranks a subset of the hospitals, and each hospital strictly
ranks its applicants. A matching M in I is an assignment of each resident to at most
one hospital so that, for each i, at most ci residents are assigned to the ith hospital.
Matching M is stable if there is no (resident,hospital) pair (r; h) such that (i) r; h 6nd
each other acceptable, (ii) r is either unassigned or prefers h to his assigned hospital,
and (iii) h either has an un6lled post or prefers r to at least one of the residents
assigned to it. Again, the Gale=Shapley algorithm may be extended to 6nd a stable
3 Implicitly here, and henceforth for other stability de6nitions, such a pair (m; w) is de6ned to block M ,
or to be a blocking pair with respect to M , as for the SM case.
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matching for a given instance of HR [6, Section 1:6:3]. Also, analogous to the SMI
case, every stable matching in I has the same size, matches exactly the same set of
residents, and 6lls exactly the same number of posts at each hospital. (This is known
as the ‘Rural Hospitals Theorem’ [20, 4, 21].) Note that, in an instance of HR, it is
not necessary for the numbers of residents and hospital posts to be equal; however, for
simplicity we assume in this paper that the numbers of men and women are equal in
an SMI instance.
1.2. Ties in the preference lists
An alternative natural extension of the original stable marriage problem arises when
each person need not rank all members of the opposite sex in strict order. Some of
those involved might be indi@erent among certain members of the opposite sex, so that
preference lists may involve ties. 4 We use SMT to stand for the variant of SM in
which preference lists are complete but may include ties. In this context, a matching
M is stable if there is no (man,woman) pair (m;w), each of whom strictly prefers the
other to his=her partner in M . Note that this stability criterion is referred to as weak
stability in [10], where two other notions of stability are formulated for SMT. However,
of the three de6nitions, it is weak stability which has received the most attention in
the literature [20, 18, 19, 14]. We are concerned exclusively with weak stability in this
paper, and henceforth for brevity, the term stability will be used to indicate weak
stability when ties are present.
By breaking the ties arbitrarily, an instance I of SMT becomes an instance I ′ of
SM, and it is clear that a stable matching for I ′ is also a stable matching for I . Thus,
a stable matching for I can be found using the Gale=Shapley algorithm. (Conversely,
given a stable matching M in I , it is not diNcult to see that there is an instance IM
of SM in which M is stable. Hence, a matching M is stable in I if and only if M is
stable in some instance of SM obtained from I by breaking the ties.)
1.3. Ties and incomplete preference lists
In this paper, we focus on the variant of the stable marriage problem, denoted
SMTI, which incorporates both extensions described above. Thus, an instance I of
SMTI comprises preference lists, each of which may involve ties and=or be incomplete.
A combination of the earlier de6nitions indicates that a matching M in I is stable if
there is no (man,woman) pair (m;w), each of whom is either unmatched in M and
6nds the other acceptable, or strictly prefers the other to his=her partner in M .
As observed above, all stable matchings for a given instance of SMI are of the same
size, and all stable matchings for a given instance of SMT are complete (and therefore
4 In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where the indi@erence takes the form of ties in the
preference lists, but it may be veri6ed that all results are extendable to the general case where the preference
lists are arbitrary partial orders.
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of the same size). However, for a given instance of SMTI, it is no longer the case that
all stable matchings need be of the same size. This fact does not appear to have been
noted explicitly in the literature previously. We give a simple example to illustrate
this in Section 2. Analogous observations apply if we introduce the possibility of ties
into HR—we refer to this problem as Hospitals=Residents problem with Ties (HRT)
[13]. The stability criterion for HRT may be de6ned by substituting ‘strictly prefers’
for ‘prefers’ in parts (ii) and (iii) of the stability criterion for HR. Clearly, SMTI is a
special case of HRT (in which every hospital has one post, and the numbers of posts
and residents are equal).
1.4. The practical setting
As stable matchings in an SMTI instance may be of di@erent sizes, the question
arises as to whether there exists an eNcient algorithm to 6nd a maximum cardinality
stable matching for a given instance of SMTI and=or HRT. This question has particular
signi6cance within the context of matching residents to hospitals. As is current practice
in the National Resident Matching Program [20] in the US and the Canadian Resident
Matching Service [1], hospitals must rank a possibly large number of applicants in strict
order of preference. However, it is unrealistic to expect large and popular hospitals to
provide a strict ranking of all of their applicants; they might be happier, say, to rank
their favourite applicants, and then group together the remainder at the tail of their list.
In the recently introduced Scottish Pre-registration house oNcer Allocations (SPA)
matching scheme [11, 16], any hospital may indeed include a tie at the tail of its
preference list, but all ties are broken arbitrarily by the matching program so that the
preference lists become strict. However, the previous observation indicates that breaking
the ties in di@erent ways can a@ect the sizes of the subsequent stable matchings. Since a
prime objective is to match as many residents as possible, it would be desirable to have
a strategy to break the ties so as to maximise the cardinality of the consequent stable
matchings. In fact, as we shall show in this paper, the existence of a polynomial-time
algorithm for this problem is unlikely, since a related decision problem turns out to
be NP-complete, and the result holds for the restrictions corresponding to this practical
setting that we have described. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm for the
maximisation problem.
1.5. Egalitarian and minimum regret stable matchings
Related stable matching problems which also have applications to centralised match-
ing schemes involve 6nding ‘fair’ stable matchings which maximise the overall
‘happiness’ of the participants in some sense. To be more precise, let I be an in-
stance of SMT and let M be a stable matching in I . For a person q in I , de6ne
cM (q), the cost of M for q, to be the ranking (possibly joint ranking, if ties are in-
volved) of pM (q) in q’s preference list. For example, if some woman w has preference
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list 5 m2 (m1 m3) m4 in I , then cM (w)= 1; 2; 2; 4 if w’s partner in M is m2; m1; m3; m4
respectively. 6 Let U and W denote the set of men and women in I respectively, and
denote by w(M) the weight of M , where w(M)=
∑
q∈U∪W cM (q); similarly denote by
r(M) the regret of M , where r(M)= maxq∈U∪W cM (q). De6ne an egalitarian (resp.
minimum regret) stable matching to be one whose weight (resp. regret) is minimum,
taken over all stable matchings.
It is known that if I contains no ties (and is therefore an instance of SM), then
each of the problems of 6nding an egalitarian stable matching and a minimum regret
stable matching is polynomial-time solvable [12, 5]. However in this paper we show
that, for an arbitrary instance of SMT, both of these problems are NP-hard, and are
hard to approximate.
1.6. Related work
Ronn [18, 19] was possibly the 6rst to study stable matching problems with ties in
the preference lists from an algorithmic point of view. Among other things, he proved
that the Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite extension of Stable Marriage),
although solvable in polynomial time when all preference lists are strict [8], becomes
NP-complete when ties are permitted. As previously mentioned, Irving [10] studied
SMT, but primarily under two alternative de6nitions of stability to the one used here.
Recently, Iwama et al. [14] have also investigated SMT and SMTI, and present two
reductions proving the NP-completeness of the problem of deciding whether a given
SMTI instance has a complete stable matching. However, both reductions introduce
instances containing ties of length at least three, and ties on both sides. Also, it is
shown that, for an SMT instance of size n, it is hard to approximate an egalitarian stable
matching within a factor of n1−, for any ¿0. But again, the constructed instance
contains ties of length at least three, and ties on both sides.
1.7. Summary of results
In this section, we outline the organisation of the remainder of this paper. The
following list indicates the main results that we establish, some of which have already
been discussed in greater detail: (In what follows, the reader should bear in mind that
SMT is a special case of SMTI, which in turn is a special case of HRT.)
(1) In contrast to the case where preference lists are strictly ordered or complete (or
both), a single instance of SMTI may admit stable matchings of di@erent sizes
(Section 2).
5 In a preference list throughout this paper, persons within round brackets are tied.
6 For the egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems, the cost of a matching for a person q
whose preference list is partially ordered may be de6ned as follows. Assume that ≺q denotes q’s list, where
r≺q s if and only if q strictly prefers r to s. Then cM (q) is 1 plus the number of predecessors in ≺q of
pM (q).
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(2) For a given instance of SMTI, 6nding a stable matching of maximum, or minimum,
size is NP-hard, even in the highly constrained case where the ties occur at the
tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie
is of length 2 (Section 2).
(3) There is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm to 6nd a stable matching of
maximum, or minimum, size for a given instance of HRT; indeed, the maximum
size cannot exceed the minimum size by more than a factor of 2 (Section 2).
(4) For a given instance of SMT, determining whether a given (man, woman) pair is
stable, i.e. whether they can be paired in a stable matching, is NP-complete, even
if the ties occur at the tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie
per list, and each tie is of length 2 (Section 3).
(5) For a given instance I of SMT, each of the problems of 6nding an egalitarian and
a minimum regret stable matching is NP-hard, and not approximable within n1−,
for any ¿0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of participants in I . Each of
these results holds even if the ties occur on one side only and each tie is of length
2 (Section 4).
2. Cardinality of stable matchings in SMTI
As a simple illustration of the fact that an SMTI instance can have stable matchings
of di@erent sizes, consider the following instance involving two men, m1; m2, and two
women, w1; w2:
m1 : w1 w1 : (m1 m2)
m2 : w1 w2 w2 : m2
There are two stable matchings for this instance, namely {(m2; w1)}, of cardinality 1,
and {(m1; w1); (m2; w2)}, of cardinality 2.
In this section, we prove that the existence of algorithms to 6nd a stable matching
of maximum or minimum cardinality for a given instance of SMTI is unlikely, un-
der several simultaneous restrictions. We also give an upper bound for how closely
such matchings can be eNciently approximated for HRT, and remark that there is an
interpolation result for stable matchings in SMTI.
De6ne the following decision problems:
Name: MAX (resp. MIN) CARDINALITY SMTI.
Instance: n men and n women, preference list of women for each man, preference
list of men for each woman, and integer K ∈Z+.
Question: Does the given instance admit a stable matching M with |M |¿ K (resp.
|M |6 K)?
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Name: MINIMUM (resp. EXACT) MAXIMAL MATCHING.
Instance: Graph G=(V; E) and integer K ∈Z+.
Question: Does G have a maximal matching M with |M |6 K (resp. |M |=K)?
MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING is NP-complete, 7 even for subdivision graphs 8 [7].
2.1. Maximum cardinality stable matchings
We begin by proving that MAX CARDINALITY SMTI is hard when the ties are on one side
only. The transformation begins from EXACT MAXIMAL MATCHING, the NP-completeness
of which clearly follows from the corresponding result for MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING.
Lemma 1. MAX CARDINALITY SMTI is NP-complete; even if the ties occur on one side
only.
Proof. Clearly MAX CARDINALITY SMTI is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform
from EXACT MAXIMAL MATCHING for subdivision graphs. Let G=(V; E) and K ∈Z+ be an
instance of this problem. Then G is the subdivision graph of some graph G′=(V ′; E′),
so that V =V ′ ∪ E′ and
E = {{e; v}: e ∈ E′ ∧ v ∈ V ′ ∧ v is incident to e in G′}:
Also G has a bipartition (U;W ), where U =E′ and W =V ′. Thus every vertex in U
has degree 2 in G. Without loss of generality, we may assume that G′ is connected and
is not a forest, so that |E′| ¿ |V ′|, i.e., |U | ¿ |W |. Again without loss of generality,
we may assume that |U |= |W |. For if |U |= |W | + r for some r¿0, then we may
add r vertices a1; : : : ; ar to U , and 2r vertices b1; : : : ; br , c1; : : : ; cr to W , where ai is
adjacent to bi and ci for each i (1 6 i 6 r). Clearly, every vertex in the new set U
has degree 2 in the new graph, and G has a maximal matching of size K if and only
if the transformed graph has a maximal matching of size K + r. Finally, without loss
of generality, we may assume that K 6 n, where n= |U |= |W |.
Let U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} and W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn}. We construct an instance I of
MAX CARDINALITY SMTI as follows: let U ∪U ′∪X be the set of men, and let W ∪Y ∪Z be
the set of women, where U ′= {m′1; m′2; : : : ; m′n}, X = {x1; x2; : : : ; xn−K}, Y = {y1; y2; : : : ;
yn}, and Z = {z1; z2; : : : ; zn−K}. Assume that ji and ki are two sequences such that
ji¡ki, {mi; wji}∈E and {mi; wki}∈E (1 6 i 6 n). For any wj (1 6 j 6 n), let Mj
contain the men mi such that {mi; wj}∈E, and let M ′j contain the men m′i such that
7 In fact, Horton and Kilakos proved that MINIMUM EDGE DOMINATING SET is NP-complete for this class
of graphs. The MINIMUM EDGE DOMINATING SET problem is to determine, given a graph G= (V; E) and
an integer K ∈Z+, whether G contains an edge dominating set of size at most K . A set of edges S is an
edge dominating set in G if every edge in E\S is adjacent to some edge in S. It is known that MINIMUM
MAXIMAL MATCHING and MINIMUM EDGE DOMINATING SET are polynomially equivalent; indeed the size
of a minimum maximal matching of a given graph G is equal to the size of a minimum edge dominating
set of G [23].
8 A subdivision graph G is a graph obtained from another graph G′ by replacing every edge in G′ by a
path of length 2 in G.
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{mi; wj}∈E and j= ki. Create a preference list for each person as follows:
mi : yi wji wki [women in Z] (16 i 6 n)
m′i : yi wki (16 i 6 n)
xi : [women in W ] (16 i 6 n− K)
wj : (men in Mj ∪M ′j ) (x1 : : : xn−K) (16 j 6 n)
yj : (mj m′j) (16 j 6 n)
zj : (m1 : : : mn) (16 j 6 n− K)
In a preference list throughout this paper, persons within square brackets are listed in
arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears. Clearly the ties occur in
the women’s preference lists only. To complete the construction of the instance, we set
the target value to be K ′=3n− K . Clearly, the maximum size of stable matching for
this instance is at most K ′. We claim that G has a maximal matching of size exactly
K if and only if the stable marriage instance admits a stable matching of size K ′.
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M |=K . We construct a
matching M ′ in I as follows. For each edge {mi; wj} in M , if j= ji, then we add
(mi; wji) and (m
′
i ; yi) to M
′. 9 If j= ki, then we add (m′i ; wki) and (mi; yi) to M
′. There
remain 2(n−K) men of the form mpi ; m′pi (16i6n−K) who are as yet unmatched. Add
(mpi ; zi) and (m
′
pi ; ypi) to M
′ (16i6n−K). Similarly there remain n−K women of the
form wqi (16i6n−K) who are as yet unmatched. Add (xi; wqi) to M ′ (16i6n−K).
Clearly M ′ is a matching of size 2K + 2(n− K) + (n− K)=K ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no person in X ∪Y ∪Z , can be involved in a
blocking pair of M ′. Similarly, neither can any man in U ′, since yi’s list is a single
tie (16i6n). Also, no unmatched pair (mi; wj) blocks M ′. For if this occurs, then
(mi; zk)∈M ′ for some zk ∈Z , and (xl; wj)∈M ′ for some xl ∈X . Thus no edge of M
is incident to mi or wj in G. Hence M ∪{{mi; wj}} is a matching in G, contradicting
the maximality of M . Thus M ′ is stable.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I , where |M ′|=K ′. Then
everybody has a partner in M ′. For each i (16i6n), at most one of mi and m′i is
matched in M ′ to a woman in W , for otherwise yi is unmatched, a contradiction. Thus,
M = {{mi; wj} ∈ E: 16 i; j 6 n ∧ ((mi; wj) ∈ M ′ ∨ (m′i ; wj) ∈ M ′)}
is a matching in G. There are exactly n−K men mri (16i6n−K) who have a partner
from Z in M ′. Since pM ′(m′ri)=yri (16i6n− K), then |M |=K .
To complete the proof, it remains to show that M is maximal. For, suppose not.
Then there is some edge {mi; wj} in G such that no edge of M is incident to either
mi or wj. Thus (mi; zk)∈M ′ for some zk ∈Z , and (xl; wj)∈M ′ for some xl ∈X . But
then (mi; wj) blocks M ′, for mi strictly prefers wj to zk , and wj strictly prefers mi to
xl. This contradiction to the stability of M ′ implies that M is indeed maximal.
9 Note that, in this paper, we use (m; w) to denote a (man,woman) pair in a stable marriage instance, and
{m; w} to denote an edge connecting vertices m and w in a graph.
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Thus, MAX CARDINALITY SMTI is NP-complete if each man’s preference list contains
no ties, and each woman’s preference list comprises either one tie or two ties. As a
by-product, the proof establishes NP-completeness for the question of whether a com-
plete stable matching exists in the constructed instance of SMTI (this fact will be used
henceforth). We now demonstrate NP-completeness for MAX CARDINALITY SMTI in the
case that the ties are at the tails of the lists and on one side only, there is at most one
tie per list, and each tie is of length 2. Our exposition is made simpler if we transform
from MAX CARDINALITY SMTI when restricted to the case that each man’s preference list
contains no ties, and each woman’s preference list comprises two ties (a ‘tie’ can be
of length 1 for this purpose). To see that the problem remains NP-complete for this
restriction, consider the instance of MAX CARDINALITY SMTI as constructed in the proof of
Lemma 1. Clearly, the preference list of each woman in W comprises two ties, and
the preference list of each woman in Y ∪Z comprises one tie. If ej is any woman in
Y ∪Z , then we append a new man aj to her list. Create, in addition, a new man bj
and two new women cj; dj. The preference lists of the new persons are as follows:
aj : cj dj ej cj : aj bj
bj : dj cj dj : bj aj
Clearly (aj; cj)∈M and (bj; dj)∈M , for any stable matching M in the transformed in-
stance. In addition, every woman’s preference list in the transformed instance comprises
two ties (where a tie can be of length 1 in this case).
Theorem 2. MAX CARDINALITY SMTI is NP-complete, even if the ties are at the tails of
the lists and on one side only; there is at most one tie per list; and each tie is of
length 2.
Proof. Membership in NP was established in Lemma 1. To show NP-hardness, we
transform from the restricted version of MAX CARDINALITY SMTI as discussed above, in
which each man’s preference list contains no ties, each woman’s preference list com-
prises two ties (where a tie can be of length 1), and the target value is equal to the
number of men. Let I be an instance of this problem, in which U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn}
is the set of men, and W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn} is the set of women. For each woman
wj ∈W , let Mhj (resp. Mtj ) be the set of men tied at the head (resp. tail) of wj’s list.
Assume that
Mhj = {mkj; 1 ; mkj; 2 ; : : : ; mkj; hj } and Mtj = {mlj; 1 ; mlj; 2 ; : : : ; mlj; tj }
for some hj¿0 and tj¿0. We form an instance I ′ of MAX CARDINALITY SMTI as follows.
Let U ∪ (⋃i=ni=1 Xi) be the set of men in I ′, and let (⋃ j=nj=1 Wj)∪Y be the set of women
in I ′, where
Wj = {wj;r: 16 r 6 hj + tj} (16 j 6 n);
Xi = {xi;r: 16 r 6 hi + ti} (16 i 6 n)
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and
Y = {yj: 16 j 6 n}:
For each j (16j6n), let Wtj =
⋃r=hj+tj
r=hj+1 {wj; r}. We form the preference lists of the
persons in I ′ as follows. Each man in U initially has the same preference list in I ′
as in I . Let mi (16i6n) be given, and let wj be any woman who appears in mi’s list
in I . If mi ∈Mhj , then mi =mkj; a for some a (16a6hj); we replace wj by the women
in {wj; a}∪Wtj in any strict order in mi’s preference list in I ′. Otherwise, mi ∈Mtj , and
mi =mlj; b for some b (16b6tj); we replace wj by wj; b+hj in mi’s preference list in I
′.
The other preference lists in I ′ are as follows:
xi; r : (wi; r yi) (16 i 6 n; 16 r 6 hi + ti)
wj; r : xj; r mkj; r (16 j 6 n; 16 r 6 hj)
wj; r+hj : xj; r+hj [men in M
h
j ] mlj; r (16 j 6 n; 16 r 6 tj)
yj : [men in Xj] (16 j 6 n)
Clearly the ties occur in the men’s preference lists only, any tie forms the whole of
the list in which it appears, and each tie is of length 2. We claim that I has a stable
matching in which everybody is matched if and only if I ′ does (implicitly we set the
target value in I ′ to be the number of men in I ′).
For, suppose that I has such a matching M . Let mi (16i6n) be given, and let
wj =pM (mi). If mi ∈Mhj , then mi =mkj; a for some a (16a6hj). If mi ∈Mtj , then
mi =mlj; b for some b (16b6tj); let a= b+ hj. In both cases, add the pairs (mi; wj; a),
(xj; r ; wj; r) (for 16r6hj + tj, r 	= a), and (xj; a; yj) to M ′. Clearly M ′ is a complete
matching in I ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no man in Xi (16i6n), and consequently no
woman in Y , can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ in I ′. Now suppose that (mi; wj; a)
blocks M ′ in I ′. Then a¿hj and mi ∈Mhj . Let mp=pM ′(wj; a); then mp=mlj; b , where
b= a − hj. Clearly (mi; wj; a) =∈M ′, and also (mi; wj; r) =∈M ′ (for 16r6hj + tj, r 	= a),
since (xj; r ; wj; r)∈M ′. Thus pM ′(mi) =∈Wj, so that in I , mi strictly prefers wj to pM (mi).
Also, in I , wj strictly prefers mi to mp. Hence (mi; wj) blocks M in I , a contradiction.
Thus M ′ is stable in I ′.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I ′ in which everybody is
matched. Let j (16j6n) be given. Then pM ′(yj)= xj; a for some a (16a6hj + tj),
and hence pM ′(wj; a)=mi, for some mi ∈U . Since pM ′(xj; r)=wj; r (for 16r6hj + tj,
r 	= a), then M ′ ∩ (U ×Wj)= {(mi; wj; a)}. Let mi be the partner of wj in M . Clearly
M is a complete matching in I .
Suppose that (mi; wj) blocks M in I . Let mp=pM (wj). Then in I , wj strictly prefers
mi to mp, so that mi ∈Mhj and mp ∈Mtj . Thus mp=mlj; b for some b (16b6tj), so that
wj; a=pM ′(mp), where a= b + hj. Now in I ′, wj; a strictly prefers mi to mp. Also in
I ′, mi strictly prefers wj; a to pM ′(mi) (since pM (mi) 	=wj implies that pM ′(mi) =∈Wj).
Thus (mi; wj; a) blocks M ′ in I ′, a contradiction. Hence M is stable in I .
D.F. Manlove et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 276 (2002) 261–279 271
2.2. Minimum cardinality stable matchings
It is also possible to establish the NP-completeness of MIN CARDINALITY SMTI, in the
case that ties are at the tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per
list, and each tie is of length 2. We begin by demonstrating NP-completeness for the
6rst two restrictions holding simultaneously, using a similar transformation to the one
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. MIN CARDINALITY SMTI is NP-complete; even if the ties are at the tails of lists
and on one side only; and there is at most one tie per list.
Proof. Clearly MIN CARDINALITY SMTI is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform from
MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING for subdivision graphs. Let G=(V; E) and K ∈Z+ be an
instance of this problem. Then G is the subdivision graph of some graph G′=(V ′; E′),
so that V =V ′ ∪E′ and
E = {{e; v}: e ∈ E′ ∧ v∈V ′ ∧ v is incident to e in G′}:
Also G has a bipartition (U;W ), where U =E′ and W =V ′. Thus every vertex in U
has degree 2 in G. As in Lemma 1, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
|U |= |W |= n, and K6n.
Let U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} and W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn}. We construct an instance I of
MIN CARDINALITY SMTI as follows: let U ∪U ′ be the set of men, and let W ∪Y be the set
of women, where U ′= {m′1; m′2; : : : ; m′n} and Y = {y1; y2; : : : ; yn}. Assume that ji and ki
are two sequences such that ji¡ki, {mi; wji}∈E and {mi; wki}∈E (16i6n). For any
wj (16j6n), let Mj (resp. M ′j ) contain the men mi (resp. m
′
i) such that {mi; wj}∈E.
Create a preference list for each person as follows:
mi : yi wji wki (16i6n)
m′i : yi wki wji (16i6n)
wj : (members of Mj and M ′j ) (16j6n)
yj : (mj m′j) (16j6n)
Clearly, the ties occur in the women’s preference lists only, and any tie forms the
whole of the list in which it appears. To complete the construction of I , we set the
target value to be K ′= n + K . We claim that G has a maximal matching of size at
most K if and only if I admits a stable matching of size at most K ′.
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M |= k6K . We construct
a matching M ′ in I as follows. For each edge {mi; wj} in M , if j= ji, then we add
(mi; wji) and (m
′
i ; yi) to M
′. If j= ki, then we add (m′i ; wki) and (mi; yi) to M
′. There
remain n − k men of the form m′pi (16i6n − k) who are as yet unmatched. Add
(m′pi ; ypi) to M
′ (16i6n− k). Clearly M ′ is a matching of size 2k + (n− k)6K ′. It
remains to show that M ′ is stable.
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No woman in Y can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′, since every such woman
is matched in M ′. Additionally, no unmatched pair (mi; wj) blocks M ′. For if this
occurs, then each of mi and wj is unmatched in M ′, and thus no edge of M is incident
to either vertex in G. Hence M ∪{{mi; wj}} is a matching in G, contradicting the
maximality of M . Finally, no unmatched pair (m′i ; wj) blocks M
′, for either (m′i ; yi)∈M ′
or (m′i ; wki)∈M ′ holds. Thus M ′ is stable.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I , where |M ′|= k ′6K ′. For
each i (16i6n), yi is matched in M ′, for otherwise (mi; yi) blocks M ′, a contradiction.
Thus at most one of mi and m′i is matched in M
′ to a woman in W . Hence
M = {{mi; wj} ∈ E: 16 i; j 6 n ∧ ((mi; wj) ∈ M ′ ∨ (m′i ; wj) ∈ M ′)}
is a matching in G, and |M |= |M ′| − n= k ′ − n6K .
To complete the proof, it remains to show that M is maximal. For, suppose not.
Then there is some edge {mi; wj} in G such that no edge of M is incident to either
mi or wj. Thus m∗i and wj are both unmatched in M
′, where m∗i ∈{mi; m′i}. Since each
of m∗i ; wj 6nds the other acceptable, then (m
∗
i ; wj) blocks M
′. This contradiction to the
stability of M ′ implies that M is indeed maximal.
By transforming from the NP-complete problem MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING for the
subdivision graphs of graphs of maximum degree 3 [7], it may be veri6ed that the
length of any tie in the instance of MIN CARDINALITY SMTI constructed in Lemma 3 is
either 2, 4 or 6. We now show how to eliminate the ties of length greater than 2.
Theorem 4. MIN CARDINALITY SMTI is NP-complete; even if the ties occur at the tails of
lists and on one side only; there is at most one tie per list; and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. Membership in NP was established in Lemma 3. To show NP-hardness, we
transform from the restricted version of MIN CARDINALITY SMTI as discussed above, in
which each man’s preference list contains no ties, and each woman’s preference list
comprises a tie of length either 2, 4 or 6. Let I be an instance of this problem,
in which U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} is the set of men, W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn} is the set of
women, and K ∈Z+ is the target value. Without loss of generality, suppose that
W ′= {w1; w2; : : : ; wt} is the set of women, each of whom has a preference list com-
prising a tie of length 6. Let W ′′=W\W ′. For each woman wj ∈W ′, let Mj be the set
of men tied in wj’s list. Assume that
Mj = {mkj; 1 ; mkj; 2 ; : : : ; mkj; 6}:
We now form an instance I ′ of MIN CARDINALITY SMTI. Let U ∪ (⋃ j=tj=1 (Pj ∪Rj)) be the set
of men in I ′, and let W ′′ ∪ (⋃ j=tj=1 (Wj ∪Qj ∪{sj})) be the set of women in I ′, where
Pj = {pj; l: 16l66}, Qj = {qj; l: 16l65}, Rj = {rj; l: 16l65}, and Wj = {wj; l : 16l
66}. We form the preference lists of the persons in I ′ as follows. Each woman in
W ′′ has the same preference list in I ′ as in I . Each man in U initially has the same
preference list in I ′ as in I . Now let mi (16i6n) be given, and suppose that some
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woman wj ∈W ′ appears in mi’s list in I . Replace wj by all the women in Wj in arbitrary
(strict) order in mi’s preference list in I ′. The other preference lists in I ′ are as follows,
for each j (16j6t):
pj;l : qj;l wj;l (16 l6 5)
pj;6 : [women in Qj] wj;6
qj;l : rj;l (pj;l pj;6) (16 l6 5)
rj;l : sj qj;l (16 l6 5)
sj : (rj;1 rj;2 rj;3 rj;4 rj;5)
wj;l : pj;l mkj;l [men in Mj\{mkj;l}] (16 l6 6)
Clearly, the ties occur in the women’s preference lists only, any tie is at the tail of
some woman’s list, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie has length 2, 4 or 5
(we discuss in due course how to eliminate ties of length 4 and 5). Set K ′=K +11t.
We claim that I has a stable matching of size at most K if and only if I ′ has a stable
matching of size at most K ′.
For, suppose that M is a stable matching in I , where |M |= k6K . We construct
a matching M ′ in I ′ as follows. Each woman in W ′′ is unmatched in M ′ if she is
unmatched in M , otherwise she is given the same partner in M ′ as in M . Now let
wj ∈W ′. If wj is unmatched in M , then add the pairs (pj; l; wj; l) (16l65), (pj;6; qj;5),
(rj; l; qj; l) (16l64) and (rj;5; sj) to M ′. Now suppose that wj is matched in M , to mi say.
Then mi =mkj; a for some a (16a66). Add (mi; wj; a) to M
′. For each l (16l 	= a66),
add the pair (pj; l; wj; l) to M ′. Add the pair (pj; a; qj; b) to M ′, where b= min{a; 5}. For
each l (16l 	= b65), add the pairs (rj; l; qj; l) to M ′. Finally, add the pair (rj; b; sj) to
M ′. Clearly M ′ is a matching in I ′, and |M ′|= k + 11t6K ′.
It may be veri6ed that, for each j (16j6t), every person z ∈Pj ∪Qj ∪Rj ∪{sj} is
matched in M ′. Hence, by inspection of z’s preference list in I ′, we may deduce that
z cannot be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ in I ′. Clearly, if (mi; wj) blocks M ′
in I ′, where wj ∈W ′′, then (mi; wj) blocks M in I , a contradiction. Now suppose that
(mi; wj; l) blocks M ′ in I ′, where 16l66. Then wj; l is unmatched in M ′, so that l=6
and wj is unmatched in M . Since mi is not matched to any member of Wj in M ′, then
(mi; wj) blocks M in I , a contradiction. Hence M ′ is stable in I ′.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I ′, where M ′= k ′6K ′. It is
easy to see that, for every j (16j6t), each member of Pj ∪Qj ∪Rj ∪{sj} must be
matched in M ′. We construct a matching M in I as follows. Each woman in W ′′ is
unmatched in M if she is unmatched in M ′, otherwise she is given the same partner
in M as in M ′. Now let wj ∈W ′. If every member of Wj is matched in M ′, then some
woman wj; l (16l66) has a man mi ∈Mj as her partner in M ′: let mi be the partner
of wj in M . Otherwise, let wj be unmatched in M . Clearly M is a matching in I , and
|M |= k ′ − 11t6K .
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Now suppose that (mi; wj) blocks M in I . If wj ∈W ′′, then (mi; wj) blocks M ′ in
I ′, a contradiction, so suppose that wj ∈W ′. Since wj’s list in I comprises a single
tie, then wj is unmatched in M . Thus some wj; l (16l66) is unmatched in M ′. But
then mi is not matched to any member of Wj in M ′. Thus (mi; wj; l) blocks M ′ in I ′, a
contradiction. Hence M is stable in I .
Clearly I ′ contains ties of length 4 and 5. However, the construction of I ′ does not
rely on any special properties of the ties of length 6, and thus a similar reduction can
be used in order to replace the ties of length 5 in I ′ by ties of length 2 and 4 occupying
di@erent women’s lists. (This method is applicable, since a woman in I ′ who has a tie
of length 5 in her list does not 6nd any other men acceptable apart from the 6ve tied
men.) Similarly, a further iteration will replace the ties of length 4 by ties of length
2 and 3 occupying di@erent women’s lists, and a 6nal iteration will give an instance
with ties of length 2 only. Since the additional ties of length 2 that are generated at
each stage appear only at the tails of women’s lists, and there is at most one tie per
list, then it is clear that we end up with an instance which satis6es the restrictions
of the statement of the theorem, and furthermore, this instance can be constructed in
polynomial time from I .
2.3. Approximability results
It turns out that, for a given instance I of HRT, each of the problems of 6nding
stable matching of minimum or maximum size is approximable within a factor of
2. This follows immediately by choosing an arbitrary stable matching, and from the
following result:
Theorem 5. For an arbitrary instance of HRT; the size of the largest stable matching
is at most twice the size of the smallest.
Proof. Let I be an instance of HRT, and let M be a stable matching in I of maximum
cardinality. Suppose that M ′ is any stable matching in I , and suppose that |M ′|¡|M |=2.
Then there is a set r1; : : : ; rp of residents in I such that, for each j (16j6p), rj is
unmatched in M ′ but matched in M , where p¿|M ′|. As rj is matched in M (16j6p),
then there are p hospitals hi1 ; : : : ; hip (not necessarily distinct), such that rj is assigned
to hij in M (16j6p). Let k = |{hi1 ; : : : ; hip}| and let t be the sum of the capacities
of the k distinct hospitals. Each of the hospitals must be fully subscribed in M ′, for
otherwise some hospital hij (16j6p) has a vacancy in M
′, so that (rj; hij) blocks M
′,
a contradiction. Thus |M ′|¿t. But t¿p, so |M ′|¿p, a contradiction.
2.4. Stable matchings interpolate
Given that the stable matchings in an instance of SMTI can be of di@erent sizes,
the question arises as to whether there exist stable matchings of all sizes between the
minimum and maximum, i.e. whether stability in SMTI is an interpolating invariant.
We remark that the answer is in the aNrmative; furthermore, given an SMTI instance
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and stable matchings of sizes i; j, we may 6nd in polynomial time a stable matching
of size k, for each i¡k¡j. The proof is omitted here; see [17] for further details.
3. Testing whether a (man,woman) pair is stable in SMT
In this section, we show that the problem of determining whether a given (man,
woman) pair (m;w) is stable in an instance I of SMT (i.e. whether there exists a
stable matching M in I such that (m;w)∈M) is NP-complete. Note that, when ties
are absent, this problem is polynomial-time solvable [5].
Theorem 6. For a given instance of SMT and a given (man;woman) pair (m;w); the
problem of determining whether (m;w) is a stable pair is NP-complete; even if the
ties occur at the tails of lists and on one side only; there is at most one tie per list;
and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. Clearly this problem is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform from the
NP-complete problem MAX CARDINALITY SMTI when ties are at the tails of lists and on
the women’s side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2:
let U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} be the set of men and let W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn} be the set of
women in a given instance I of this problem. We may assume that the given target
value in I is equal to n. Let Pi (resp. Qi) denote the preference list of man mi (resp.
woman wi) for 16i6n (as mentioned in Section 1, without loss of generality, we
may assume that for any man mi ∈U and for any woman wj ∈W , wj ∈Pi if and only
if mi ∈Qj). We construct an instance I ′ of SMT as follows: let {m0}∪U be the set
of men, and let {w0}∪W be the set of women. Create a preference list in I ′ for each
person as follows:
m0 : w0 : : : w0 : : : : m0
mi : Pi w0 : : : (16 i 6 n) wi : : : : Qi (16 i 6 n)
The symbol ‘: : :’ in a person p’s preference list denotes all people in I ′ of the opposite
sex to p who are not explicitly listed elsewhere in p’s preference list, listed in arbitrary
strict order at the point where the symbol appears. Clearly, the ties in I ′ occur at the
tails of lists and on the women’s side only, there is at most one tie per list, each tie is
of length 2, and all lists are complete. We claim that I has a complete stable matching
if and only if (m0; w0) is a stable pair in I ′.
For, suppose that M is a complete stable matching for I . Let M ′=M ∪{(m0; w0)}.
We claim that M ′ is stable in I ′. For, if some pair (m;w) blocks M ′ then either m=m0
or w=w0, as M is stable in I . But m 	=m0, since m0 has his 6rst-choice partner in
M ′. Hence w=w0, so that m=mi for some i (16i6n), and mi strictly prefers w0 to
pM (mi). But pM (mi) appears on the list Pi, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I ′, such that (m0; w0)∈M ′.
Clearly M ′ is a complete matching for I ′. Also, for any i (16i6n), we claim that
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pM ′(mi) appears on the list Pi. For if not, then mi strictly prefers w0 to pM ′(mi).
Since w0 strictly prefers mi to m0 =pM ′(w0), then (mi; w0) blocks M ′, a contradiction.
Hence, for any i (16i6n), pM ′(wi) appears on the list Qi. Thus M =M ′\{(m0; w0)}
is a complete matching in I . Clearly M is stable in I .
It is straightforward to alter the above transformation in order to prove that deter-
mining whether a given person has a stable partner (i.e. has a partner in some stable
matching) in a given SMTI instance is also NP-complete.
4. Egalitarian and minimum regret stable matchings in SMT
In this section, we prove that each of the problems of 6nding an egalitarian and a
minimum regret stable matching for a given instance of SMT is NP-hard and diNcult
to approximate.
Given an SMT instance I , denote by w(I) the weight of an egalitarian stable match-
ing in I , and denote by r(I) the regret of a minimum regret stable matching in I . Let
EGALITARIAN SMT OPT (resp. MINIMUM REGRET SMT OPT) denote the optimisation problem
which, given an instance I of SMT as its input, requires to output w(I) (resp. r(I))
as a solution. We begin by proving that EGALITARIAN SMT OPT is NP-hard and hard to
approximate.
Theorem 7. EGALITARIAN SMT OPT is not approximable within N 1−; for any ¿0; unless
P=NP; where N is the number of men in a given instance of the problem; even if the
ties are on one side only; there is at most one tie per list; and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. Let ¿0 be given, and let c=3=. We consider the NP-complete problem
MAX CARDINALITY SMTI when ties occur on the women’s side only, and each tie is of
length 2: let U = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} be the set of men and let W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn} be
the set of women in a given instance I of this problem. We may assume that the
given target value in I is equal to n. Let Pi (resp. Qi) denote the preference list
of man mi (resp. woman wi) for 16i6n. We construct an instance I ′ of SMT as
follows: let U 0 ∪ (⋃Cj=1 Uj) be the set of men, and let W 0 ∪ (⋃Cj=1Wj) be the set
of women, where C = nc−1, U 0 = {m01; m02; : : : ; m0nc}, Uj = {mj1 ; mj2 ; : : : ; mjn} (16j6C),
W 0 = {w01 ; w02 ; : : : ; w0nc}, and Wj = {wj1 ; w j2 ; : : : ; w jn } (16j6C). Thus I ′ comprises 2nc
men and 2nc women, so that N =2nc. For each i (16i6n) and j (16j6C), let P ji
denote the preference list that is obtained from Pi by replacing woman wk in Pi by the
corresponding woman wjk , for any k (16k6n). Let us refer to the women in P
j
i as
the proper women for mji . De6ne Q
j
i and the proper men for w
j
i similarly. Create a
preference list in I ′ for each person as follows:
m0i : w
0
i : : : (16 i 6 n
c)
mji : P
j
i [women in W
0] : : : (16 i 6 n; 16 j 6 C)
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w0i : m
0
i : : : (16 i 6 n
c)
wji : Q
j
i [men in U
0] : : : (16 i 6 n; 16 j 6 C)
Note that the symbol ‘: : :’ in the above preference lists has a similar meaning to its
usage in Theorem 6. Clearly, the only ties featuring in I ′ occur in the preference lists
of women of the form wji , there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2.
Suppose that M is a stable matching in I , where |M |= n. We form a matching M ′
in I ′ as follows: for each i (16i6nc), add the pair (m0i ; w
0
i ) to M
′, and for each i
(16i6n), add the pair (mji ; w
j
k ) to M
′ (16j6C), where (mi; wk)∈M . Clearly M ′ is
stable in I ′, and it may be veri6ed that
w(M ′)6 2(nc + nc−1n2)6 2
(
nc+2
2
)
since we may choose n¿3, without loss of generality. Hence w(I ′)6nc+2.
Now suppose that I does not have a stable matching of cardinality n. Let M ′ be
any stable matching in I ′. Then it may be veri6ed that, for each j (16j6C), there
is some i (16i6n) such that mji cannot be matched in M
′ to one of his proper
women. But in M ′, m0k and w
0
k must be partners, for each k (16k6n
c), and hence
cM ′(m
j
i )¿n
c. Similarly, for each j (16j6C), there is some i (16i6n) such that wji
cannot be matched in M ′ to one of her proper men, and hence cM ′(w
j
i )¿n
c. Thus
w(M ′)¿2n2c−1, so that w(I ′)¿2n2c−1.
Hence the existence of a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for EGALITARIAN
SMT OPT whose approximation ratio is as good as (2n2c−1)=nc+2 =2nc−3 would give a
polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether I has a stable matching in which
everybody is matched. Finally, 2nc−3 = (2=21−3=c)N 1−3=c¿N 1−3=c=N 1−, which con-
cludes the proof.
Note that in general, the hardness of 6nding an egalitarian stable matching in no
way implies the hardness of 6nding a minimum regret stable matching: for example,
in the case of stable roommates, although the problem of 6nding an egalitarian stable
matching is NP-hard [2], the problem of 6nding a minimum regret stable matching is
polynomial-time solvable [9]. Nevertheless, it turns out that MINIMUM REGRET SMT OPT has
similar approximability behaviour to EGALITARIAN SMT OPT. In fact, the transformation of
Theorem 7 can be adapted in a straightforward fashion to prove a result analogous to
Theorem 7 for MINIMUM REGRET SMT OPT, as we now demonstrate.
Theorem 8. MINIMUM REGRET SMT OPT is not approximable within N 1−; for any ¿0;
unless P=NP; where N is the number of men in a given instance of the problem;
even if the ties are on one side only; there is at most one tie per list; and each tie is
of length 2.
Proof. Let ¿0 be given. We consider the SMT instance I ′ constructed in Theorem 7
from the MAX CARDINALITY SMTI instance I . In order to prove the inapproximability result
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for MINIMUM REGRET SMT OPT, it suNces to take c=2= and C =1 in the construction of
I ′. Hence there are n+ nc men and n+ nc women in I ′, so that N = n+ nc.
Suppose that M is a stable matching in I , where |M |= n. We construct a matching
M ′ in I ′ as follows: for each i (16i6nc), add the pair (m0i ; w
0
i ) to M
′, and for each
i (16i6n), add the pair (m1i ; w
1
k) to M
′, where (mi; wk)∈M . Clearly M ′ is stable in
I ′, and r(M ′)6n. Hence r(I ′)6n.
Now suppose that I does not have a stable matching of cardinality n. Let M ′ be
any stable matching in I ′. Then as in Theorem 7, there is some i (16i6n) such that
cM ′(m1i )¿n
c. Thus r(M ′)¿nc, so that r(I ′)¿nc.
Hence the existence of a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for MINIMUM
REGRET SMT OPT whose approximation ratio is as good as nc=n= nc−1 would give a
polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether I has a stable matching in which
everybody is matched. Finally, nc−1¿n(c+1)(1−)¿(n+nc)(1−) =N 1− (without loss of
generality, n¿2), which concludes the proof.
Note that, for a given instance I of HRT and a stable matching M in I , a more
suitable de6nition of cM (h) for a hospital h might be the sum of the (possibly joint)
rankings of each resident designated to h in h’s list, divided by the capacity of h.
Clearly, each of the inapproximability results of Theorems 7 and 8 carries over to this
revised de6nition, by considering the restriction of HRT in which each hospital has
capacity one, and the numbers of posts and residents are equal.
5. Conclusion and open problems
In this paper, we have established the hardness of various problems involving stable
matchings in the case where the preference lists of the participants may be incomplete
and may involve ties. Among these is the important practical problem of 6nding a
stable matching of maximum cardinality for an HRT instance in which all of the ties
are on one side (the hospitals’ side), and are at the tails of lists, and there is at most
one tie per list (and even if each tie is of length 2).
A number of interesting open problems remain. These include:
• Is there an approximation algorithm for 6nding a stable matching of maximum car-
dinality in SMTI (and HRT) with a guarantee better than 2? Perhaps some special
cases, say with restrictions on the positions or size of ties, may be more accessible.
• Is the problem of 6nding a stable matching of maximum size APX-complete?
• Is there a reasonable algorithm to generate all of the stable matchings for a given
instance of SMTI (and HRT)? For each of SM and HR, such an algorithm can be
derived by exploiting the underlying lattice structure [5], but there appears to be no
such useful mathematical structure present in SMTI or HRT: Roth [20] constructs
an instance of SMT, comprising three men and three women, which admits no man-
optimal or woman-optimal stable matching.
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